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Creative Writing and the New Humanities
PAUL DAWSON
I would like to discuss how the emergent area of Creative Writing in Australian
universities might be situated in relation to what have become known as the New
Humanities.1 The first question to ask is what are the New Humanities? The term was
first used by Ian Donaldson at a symposium for the Australian Academy of the
Humanities in 1989. Donaldson pointed out that in the previous few decades new modes
of theoretical and methodological inquiry had contributed to a breakdown of the
traditional divide between the humanities and the social sciences, between a refined
liberal humanist world of the arts and a more rigorous analysis of society. The New
Humanities, as he describes the work of research centres in America, are concerned with
‘reconfiguring knowledge … bringing together new combinations of scholarly and
theoretical enquiry’ and ‘redrawing old taxonomies within the academy’.2
What Donaldson is referring to here are the disciplinary, curricular and policy changes
wrought within the academy by the impact of what we know as Theory. His tentative
phrase was solidified into an institutionally accredited term when the Academy’s
symposium of 1991 was entitled Beyond the Disciplines: The New Humanities. In the
introduction to these proceedings Ken Ruthven writes that those ‘who are making the
running in the new humanities’ use critical theory as a ‘heuristic device’ for identifying
occluded knowledges.3 The papers published, by critics such as John Frow, Meaghan
Morris and Tony Bennett, were all concerned with the new interdisciplinary enterprise of
Cultural Studies. And indeed, in 1996, Cultural and Communication Studies was
included as the tenth electoral section of the Academy, thus becoming the exemplary
discipline of the New Humanities. As Jonathan Culler has claimed, in an almost too neat
formulation, Cultural Studies is Theory put into practice.4
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Before discussing how the discipline of Creative Writing relates to this post-Theory
academy, it is worth asking what value is assigned to literature or ‘creative writing’ in the
New Humanities. In 1999 the academic journal Southern Review changed its 25-year-old
subtitle, ‘Literary and Interdisciplinary Essays’ to ‘Essays in the New Humanities’. As
Cathy Greenfield explains in her editorial, the word ‘literary’ was dropped because this
was no longer the journal’s primary focus. Rather than privileging literature as an
aesthetic category, the journal is interested in its function as a discourse alongside other
cultural practices and forms of media. It is worth noting here the ‘aims and scope’ of the
journal. According to these aims Southern Review ‘publishes essays, articles, reviews and
review articles on a wide range of cultural and media matters, as well as fiction and
poetry’. The journal goes on to explain that it seeks essays of an interdisciplinary nature
concerned not only with texts, but also with the wider discursive relations in which they
are implicated. There are no prescriptions for fiction or poetry. Is this out of deference, I
wonder, to the writer’s donnée, a retention of aesthetic criteria in the publication of
literature that are being rejected as concerns for literary criticism? Why does a journal
concerned with essays in the New Humanities publish fiction and poetry? And what sort
of writing would be appropriate?
The UTS Review, which was subtitled ‘Cultural Studies and New Writing’, claimed to
offer ‘an international space for academic and creative writing on culture’, but ‘creative
writing that no longer construes “the literary” as a site of withdrawal from politics, from
the worlds created by the media and other technologies, from new practices of history
and from the social sciences’.5 This editorial policy is more theoretically consistent,
although since the journal’s inception in 1995 only a handful of pieces have been
published under the category of ‘new writing’. Many of the ‘articles’ published, however,
could be classified as fictocriticism, creative non-fiction, or confessional criticism. What
this indicates is that there is a certain type of writing suitable to the journal’s aims. The
appellation ‘new’ refers to a currency not only in terms of temporality but also in terms of
formal innovation or experimentation, especially with generic boundaries. This suggests
the possibility of an avant-garde ‘writing’ (as opposed to ‘literature’) which could be
aligned with the academic work of the New Humanities.
What position does the discipline of Creative Writing, which concerns itself with the
production of literary works, occupy in the New Humanities? Creative Writing is not
necessarily founded on a concept of the literary as a site of withdrawal from politics and
society, but neither is the main function of the writing workshop to interrogate the
theoretical and cultural status of literature: it is to establish a standard of literary value by
which to identify what ‘works’ in exemplary texts and to apply these principles to the
aesthetic improvement of student manuscripts. Furthermore, while in Australia Creative
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mourning opens up the space between ‘I’ and ‘thou’, ‘here’ and ‘there’, ‘now’ and ‘then’.58
The condition of ‘continuity’ between self and other in ‘perverse’ melancholy must be
given up for the ‘contiguity’ that characterises the ‘normal’ work of mourning. In
Santner’s formulation of the Freudian paradigm:
[t]he capacity to feel grief for others and guilt for the suffering one has directly or
indirectly caused, depends on the capacity to experience empathy for the other as other.
This capacity in turn depends on the successful working through of those primitive
experiences of mourning which first consolidate the boundaries between self and other,
thereby opening up a space for empathy.59
Viewed through the tradition of sentimentalism that is perhaps a condition of possibility
for these models, it appears that the psychoanalytic tradition has not only sundered two
phases of a single process but also reversed the actions of the sympathetic imagination.
In the Freudian schema, empathy is an effect of the ‘space’ of difference that must be
opened up before empathy can occur. The ‘blurring’ of identities in the ex-centric
imaginative movement that characterised a necessary first phase of the process is
uncoupled from the differentiating ‘detachment’ that concluded the dialectic of empathy
in the sentimental tradition. Severed from its partner, this (melancholy) component is
then understood as a sickly ‘loop’ of self-involvement rather than an ecstatic movement
of self-transcending incorporation with the other. The name and value of empathy is then
given to the condition of contiguous separation, as though one part of the machinery of
empathy must now stand in for the whole ensemble.
A prominent topos of cultural analysis is that of ‘obstructed mourning’, sometimes cast
as melancholy stasis. For example, in the historiography of postwar Germany a
‘melancholy dialectic’ is understood to prevail.60 Similarly, in the historiography of early
modern American captivity narratives, Mitchell Breitwieser detects a ‘melancholy
semiotic’ as an effect of implicit injunctions against ‘excessive mourning’, a preference for
typological or emblematic techniques of analysis and a tendency to remain fixated on a
two-dimensional image of the beloved object, which is thus psychically ‘encrypted’.61
These features are read as analogous to the Freudian model of melancholic ‘failed
mourning’. In place of stasis the historian of early modern cultural trauma must deploy a
‘polymorphic mode of exegesis’,62 taking up multiple points of view from which to
examine the relationship with the loved object. However, even this pluralising of
horizons that keep opening up the space between ‘I’ and ‘thou’, ‘here’ and ‘there’, ‘now’
and ‘then’, might become merely mechanical if anxiety is not allowed to surface. This
feeling must be relived if healthy mourning is to displace a so-called ‘structural
mourning’ drained of affect. Structural mourning is understood as a defining symptom of
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Writing has followed the same trajectory as the New Humanities, emerging through
newer institutions in the wake of challenges to traditional forms of knowledge, its
historical and theoretical ties remain with the American New Criticism, which construed
the literary precisely in terms of aesthetic autonomy.6 I shall return to this later.
Creative Writing is also generally regarded as an apprenticeship for aspiring writers.
That is, it provides skills training for those who wish to enter the ‘literary establishment’
via mainstream publication. This is why writing programmes advertise the number of
‘successful’ graduates who have published their work. By the term ‘literary establishment’
I mean reviewers, editors, publishers and writers whose domain of professional work
involves the production and reception of literature, and who conceptualise this domain
as the ‘public sphere’ because it is located largely outside the academy. The response of
this literary establishment to the ‘culture wars’, bemoaning the professional jargon of
academics and the relativisation of literary value perpetrated by postmodernism,
establishes its opposition to critical theory. David Williamson’s highly successful play
Dead White Males (1995) is a locus classicus for this response.
What is at stake in this debate between writers and the academy is less an
understanding of literature than a struggle over who wields literary authority. If the
discipline of Creative Writing is to assume a non-antagonistic institutional position
within the New Humanities, I feel it is less important to engage in theoretical debates
about what constitutes literature than to ask: what is a literary intellectual? That is,
around what figure in the academy has literary authority traditionally accrued, and how
can a vision of authorship be elaborated in relation to it? This figure has been the critic.
Practical criticism
Modern academic criticism can trace its origins to the work of Matthew Arnold, for
whom the function of criticism was to contribute to the role of culture in maintaining
social stability by establishing the critical base for a continuum of literary works from age
to age.7 This cultural mission was joined with the traditional role of evaluating literature
in the professional practice and pedagogical tool known as practical criticism. The
technique for this academic movement comes from I.A. Richards’s experiments with
unattributed poems on student readers, and its theory from T.S. Eliot’s modernist notions
of impersonality in art, and it held sway over Anglo-American criticism and education
for the first part of the twentieth century due to the influence of F.R. Leavis and the
American New Critics, before spreading throughout the Commonwealth, including
Australia.8
The figure of literary authority that Practical Criticism promoted within the academy
was one of the critic as the moral guardian of our cultural heritage, finding in literature a
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opposition between mobility and stability … But for this to happen, poiesis—all that is
comprehended by the Western arts of representation—would need to undergo a
renovation.53
The analogical nature of the imaginative transfer that characterises empathy suggests that
empathy itself works ‘allegorically’. Pursuing the terms of the sentimental tradition
within which I have placed the process of empathic transfer, it is possible to see the
fictocritical effect of Carter’s ‘mobility’ and the ‘haze which preceded clear outlines’ as
equivalent to Jones’s thaumatropical montage, the blurring of self/other distinctions that
characterised the ecstatic and ex-centric phase of empathy. Jones’s thaumatrope, with its
provisional effect of the ‘fast motioning embrace’, and Carter’s restless metaphoricity of
(tactful) movement, visual haze and acoustic reverberations refunction the eighteenth-
and nineteenth-century conception of the sympathetic imagination as that which is ‘able
to penetrate the barrier that puts space between it and its object’ and ‘secure a
momentary but complete identification with it’.54 Further, Carter’s ‘haze’ belongs with
Muecke’s ‘clear outlines’: together they replay the dialectical oscillation between
‘neighbouring’ and ‘separation’, each figured though their equivalents in montage and
collage, metaphor and analogy respectively. These examples suggest the fragmented and
dispersed afterlife of a non-Kantian heritage available to cross-cultural scholarship. They
offer glimpses of how the fragments of this tradition might be (provisionally, partially)
reconvened, though it remains questionable to what extent such a renovation would
constitute a ‘radical aesthetic’.
Therapeutic melancholy and elegiac historiography
The call for a poetics of mourning in cross-cultural scholarship is a somewhat belated
gesture.55 The discussion will suggest that the predominantly Freudian idea of
melancholy as ‘obstructed’ mourning evident in certain studies of cultural trauma is a
pathologising of the second phase of the empathic process described in eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century sentimentalism. Empathic fictocritical effects in the service of cross-
cultural scholarship do not appear to regard the involvement of self and other as
problematic. Instead, the compositional pairs from the previous discussion suggest a
model in which provisional therapeutic effects might be understood to flow both from a
so-called ‘perverse’ melancholy and a ‘normal’ work of mourning.56
The Freudian tradition, according to Santner, equates the melancholy response to loss
with secondary narcissism, and intensifies it as a pathology in which the otherness of the
loved object is repressed; ‘narcissistic love plays itself out in the (non-)space where “I”
and “you” are not perceived as having hard edges’. ‘The melancholic grieves not so much
for the loss of the other as for the fact of otherness and all that entails.’57 ‘Normal’
—
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spiritual balm in the face of science and mass civilisation. This figure in fact appropriated
for criticism the role of the Romantic poet. Indeed it is Coleridge who first used the
term ‘practical criticism’ in his Biographia Literaria. Through ‘practical criticism’—as
he called his critical analysis of the works of Shakespeare—Coleridge hoped to discover
the essential qualities that are symptomatic of poetic power or the imagination.9 For
Coleridge, literary authority resided in the poet and, most important, the poetic process.
And Shelley uttered the most grandiloquent pronouncements on this authority of the
Romantic poet when he called poets the unacknowledged legislators of the world.10
For the Romantics, construing the literary as a site of withdrawal was in fact a political
protest. Practical criticism replaced poetic composition as the base from which the
scientific aridity and materialism of industrialised society were challenged by the human
spirit and creativity. Cleanth Brooks, a major figure among the new critics, claimed that
what he and I.A. Richards shared was an agreement that ‘the greatest and most enduring
poetry ... manifested to a high degree Coleridge’s synthesizing imagination’.11 Authority
in the academy is vested in the figure of the critic–teacher, however—the ‘priest or rabbi
of literary capital’ as Jim Merod has called him—because it is criticism that has the
responsibility of evaluating and promoting the transformative power of imaginative
literature, and its goal is to produce a readership rather than to generate new writing.12
‘Practical criticism’, according to Hugh Bredin, ‘as a teaching device, means the close
and attentive reading of literary texts, usually poetry, usually by a small group, under the
guidance of a tutor’.13 This could easily describe the writing workshop, where criticism is
applied to student manuscripts as well as literary texts. Indeed, R.P. Blackmur, whom at
least one commentator has claimed was responsible for the ‘invention’ of New Criticism,
‘earned his keep’ teaching Creative Writing with Allen Tate at Princeton University’s
Creative Arts Program from 1940.14 D.G. Myers has even claimed that ‘the method that
came to be known as “practical criticism” or “close reading” was founded upon the
sort of technical discussion of poetic problems that would occur among a group of
poets’, in particular the Fugitive group at Vanderbilt, which included many of the
New Critics.15 And Cleanth Brooks suggests that his ideas on the necessity of tension
and unity between individual words in the whole poem were gained from the
Fugitives’ poetry before I.A. Richards’s Practical Criticism displayed this concept in
critical commentary.16
Yet Creative Writing, which developed alongside the New Criticism in a handful of
American universities from the 1930s, was left with a denuded romantic aesthetics,
adopting an expressivist theory of authorship that democratised the poetic imagination
as a means of self-development, and a craft-based pedagogical practice, characterised by
the term ‘reading as a writer’, in which the ubiquitous advice to ‘show’ rather than ‘tell’
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operationalises the didactic heresy at the structural and syntactic level as well as the
thematic level.17 It thus perpetuates the dead end of the romantic legacy known as art for
art’s sake. The workshop model offers no figure of the writer for students and teachers
other than that of the artist dedicated to the discovery of a personal voice and the
development of a craft. The university, in this formulation, is nothing but a garret in the
ivory tower, and this attitude persists today.
For instance, the only mention of a social function for writers on the website for the
Associated Writing Programs in America is the statement that in ‘creative writing
workshops ... stories and poems are made as gifts for readers and listeners’, which is ‘a
highly civilized and humane act’.18 In Australia to date the main function of the
Australian Association of Writing Programs (established in 1996) has been to debate
whether creative work can be construed as research for the purposes of funding and
assessment.19 So the representative bodies of Creative Writing across two countries see
the writer as a literary Santa Claus or an academic careerist, both chasing professional
success in the literary establishment. Is it any wonder that Creative Writing has not
claimed a position of literary authority in the New Humanities if it cannot elaborate a
more forceful figure of the writer?
Oppositional criticism
According to Leela Gandhi, the New Humanities are characterised by ‘oppositional and
anti-humanist criticism’.20 The term ‘oppositional criticism’ derives from Edward Said’s
1983 book, The World, the Text, and the Critic: ‘Were I to use one word consistently along
with criticism (not as a modification but as an emphatic) it would be oppositional’.21
Oppositional criticism is founded on the assumption that the concept of autonomous
aesthetic value expounded by practical criticism, rather than being a spiritual salve
against a materialistic capitalist society, is in fact one of its chief ideological buttresses.
The new function of criticism, characterised by Terry Eagleton as a ‘struggle against the
bourgeois state’, breaks with the tradition of evaluation, preferring to uncover the
invisible political work that criticism does in the realm of culture by relating literary
works to the social forces of cultural production and consumption, or by undermining
their metaphysical assumptions.22 And it sees this textual critique as the base for social
change, rather than cultural defence.
The figure of the critic, then, no longer traces its lineage to John Dryden, the ‘father of
English criticism’, or to the Arnoldian tradition of cultural heritage, but to the tradition
of the intellectual with a political responsibility, and in particular the Marxist
intellectual.23 The typical model for the oppositional critic has been that of Foucault’s
‘specific intellectual’.24 This is exemplified by Frank Lentricchia’s Criticism and Social
—
VOLUME9 NUMBER1 MAY2003188
sentimental imagination that aims to enhance our capacity to be affected by the effects of
history. In order to develop this idea further I want to revisit the example of Stephen
Muecke’s fictocritical writing, especially Reading the Country: Introduction to Nomadology
(1984), Textual Spaces: Aboriginality and Cultural Studies (1992) and No Road (bitumen all
the way) (1997). Reading the Country avoids the effect of mastery (it doesn’t ‘speak for’
Paddy Roe’s dreaming), and avoids falling for the apparently doomed utopics of
unmediated liberty (a text that impossibly ‘speaks itself’).48 In the Road to Botany Bay: An
Essay in Spatial History, Paul Carter suggests that Reading the Country is an example of ‘the
device of the historian absenting himself as author’:
Krim Benterrak, the artist in this book, records one country, Paddy Roe, a local aborigine
… narrates another, the theoretically informed Muecke constructs yet another; but the
implication that by cutting them and overlaying them, we can attain the
multidimensionality of an aboriginal narrative seems to me an editorial illusion’.49
Muecke’s work can be read in terms of the desire ‘to replace the uni-vocal linearity of
conventional history with a “bricolage” of “texts”’. ‘It demonstrates clearly … the
authority of all viewpoints. But such an approach still perpetrates an illusion of its own;
that, in some way, the multidimensional spatiality of aboriginal culture is hereby being
imitated.’50 Paul Carter reads the ‘bricolage of texts’ as a cross-cultural hybrid writing.
Fictocriticism as ‘hybrid writing’ produces the writer’s own ‘hybridity’ as one of its
effects, and could be understood as a species of ethnographic allegory.
In a sense, Carter wants Reading the Country to valorise more successfully its textual
hybridity, inviting Muecke to perform an even more extravagant allegory than the
modesty of ‘parallelism’ or analogical contiguity would afford. It could be argued that The
Road to Botany Bay needs Reading the Country to perform its ‘geometry’ more efficiently
because Muecke’s borders, gaps and edges are the other to Carter’s preferred ‘haze which
preceded clear outlines’.51 Ken Gelder and Jane Jacobs have remarked on Carter’s
‘nostalgia for an “original” moment’, figured in the ‘haze’.52 In the terms we have been
deploying, Muecke is required to perform the political utopianism that is the other to
Carter’s alleged nostalgia. Read as responses to history as decline, the project of spatial
history is no less allegorical than Muecke’s collage.
Both projects aim to renovate critical writing on the contact zone through an
investment in kinds of metaphor that solicit activities of the reader’s empathic
imagination. Carter puts it like this in The Lie of the Land:
To avoid compacting the ground … we need to tread it lightly, circumspectly. The
approach must be poetic rather than philosophical … the challenge … is to move
differently, to learn to dissolve the emotionally catatonic and historically destructive
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Change (1983), where he asks ‘Can a literary intellectual, to come to the issue that most
preoccupies me, do radical work as a literary intellectual?’25 For Lentricchia and many
others throughout the 1980s, such as Jim Merod, Terry Eagleton, Paul Bove and Tony
Bennett, a literary intellectual was defined as a critic and university teacher of English,
whose specific role was to challenge the aesthetic view of literature and, in Lentricchia’s
words, ‘instigate a culturally suspicious, trouble-making readership’.26
In this formulation there is no complementary vision of the writer, within or without
the university, for literature is placed in an antagonistic relationship with criticism, and
the writer in the outdated mode of the universal intellectual. ‘To this day’, David Galef
claimed in 2000, ‘a tacit war exists between literary critics and writers, though both
usually publish and teach within the same department’.27 Some years earlier Marjorie
Perloff had described this relationship as a battle between the A Team of the Creative
Writing Workshop and the B Team of the Graduate Seminar in Theory.28 This division
may not seem so striking in Australia, but when Robert White reviewed ‘The State of
English Studies in the 1990s’, he was able to describe the relationship between theory
and Creative Writing in these terms:
It was, by and large, literary theorists who helped to ‘open the box’ of English Studies,
prising the way for creative writing as a respectable research pursuit. And yet the creative
writers, generally speaking (and with some notable exceptions) are the ones within our
English departments who are most suspicious of theory. After all, what author would
want to embrace a movement that made its reputation by killing off the author? 29
I would like to briefly consider one attempt to negotiate this division, provided by the
Englishman Robert Miles, because it is based on the same observation made by White
and has been endorsed by at least one Australian commentary as an ‘ingenious model’ of
Creative Writing pedagogy.30 ‘I believe’, Miles wrote in 1992, ‘that at bottom there is an
irreducible tension between the manoeuvres of contemporary theory and the practice of
teaching writing’.31 He argues, however, that this can be a productive tension in the
workshop, because it ‘affords the student the opportunity of comparing theories of how
texts come into being with the actual experience of bringing texts into being.’32
For Miles, ‘contemporary theory’ is exemplified by poststructuralist critiques of
authorship. But poststructuralism does not provide a theory of how texts come into
being, or an impersonal substitute for individual experience of the creative process. It
provides a theory of the production of textual meaning, based in a linguistic
unconscious. In which case, to pit empirical practice against theoretical speculation in
the writing workshop only provides a domestication of the insights of theory. It leads
Miles to claim that Barthes’s theory of the author entering his own death at the moment
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is understood to do its (various) work, in particular the imaginatively produced
‘analogical’ historical tie between selves and others. The space for an ‘imaginative
transfer’ between a ‘here’ and a ‘there’ is visualised in Muecke’s Textual Spaces, for
example, where parallel columns of type display contiguous but discrete textualised
horizons.41 The white space between is a third zone where the imagination plays the
‘ridge’ thrown up between antinomies. In Richard Kearney’s view, the ‘oscillating
movement’ required of the imagination creates the intersubjective space of ethical
praxis.‘The imagination … needs to play … in a way which animates and enlarges our
response to the other’.42 In effect, a rehearsal of the process of empathy both closes the
gap between self and other and inevitably reopens it as a condition of historical
difference. With regard to postcolonial thought, these visual aesthetics signal an urge to
ethical engagement.
The ‘play of voices’ in collage/montage attempts the aestheticising of principled
stances in relation to objects of knowledge. In the case of collage writing, the ethical
effect of multiple stories/voices is visible in the typographic layout. The spaces between
textual fragments attest to an alleged modest refusal to claim authority or to tell the
other’s story. Empathic attentiveness informs both the self-conscious production and
reception of the fictocritical collage effect. Yet empathic criticism is not unproblematic.43
Gaye Tuchman cautions that ‘whether an ethnographer or historian is working for us or
them, that person still faces the task of assemblage, of making a montage “that speaks”
(whether or not the text is understood to be multi-vocal, “a text that speaks itself”)’.44
Addressed primarily to the eye, the collage writing of the allegorist as bricoleur is
symptomatic of a mutilated and incomplete archive of the past, and/or the
incommensurability of competing ‘stories’ in the present. In Stephen Greenblatt’s words,
‘Allegory arises from the painful absence of that which it claims to recover’45 and the
collagist works with a textual equivalent of the skull as the pathetic image for loss; she
needs to be able to bear the hollowed out spaces. Jones’s call for an elegiacs of
postcolonial cross-cultural studies asks us to be affected by the effects of history: ‘Why
did imperialists collect native skulls?’.46 She invites us to ‘seek out the surfaces of new
and difficult subjects’, to imagine how ‘we might chart the distance between those brute
materialisations of political struggle … and the historical dematerialisations by which the
skulls of the vanquished become empty vessels’.47
The aestheticised ethics of the compositional pair collage/montage are offered in the
service of various mediations that make up historical and social ties. In this sense at least
the linked visual and spatial accommodation of empathy frees up a space for others in a
linguistic instance of a sentimental community without the sneer of disparagement that
accompanies Armstrong’s use of the term. Fictocriticism relies on a politicised
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of writing enables students to understand how writers assume a narrative persona or
enter the voice of their characters, and that, in turn, discussion of craft, as a series of
technical decisions, recentres the subject, supposedly questioning theory. Too many
writers see the death of the author as the apotheosis and end point of theory, as if it had
never moved on from Barthes’s 1960s polemic, and seem to believe that their living
existence somehow disproves his thesis.
The tension between theory and practice, Miles suggests, is also ‘the conflict between
regarding writing from the point of view of the professional writer’ and ‘regarding texts
from the vantage point of literary criticism’, or between a verbal arts degree and a literary
studies degree.33 Miles argues for Creative Writing as a verbal art injected into literary
studies, which means less emphasis on the student as an aspiring writer and more on the
student as a critic. This does little to help the majority of writing programmes taught in
the former mode, which is typical of attempts to construct ‘integrated’ programmes of
creative writing and literary criticism.34
The use of Theory in Creative Writing also operates as a reconfigured aesthetics by
proposing ideal models of writing. The teaching of fictocriticism, for instance, flourishes
in the wake of the post-structuralist collapse of generic boundaries between literature
and criticism and the challenges of feminist theory to academic discourse.35 Yet post-
structuralist theory deriving from the work of Barthes and Derrida (regularly cited as
influences on fictocriticism) has been castigated for its introspective self-reflexivity and
political quietude. Deconstruction has been called the ‘new new criticism’ because its
literary appropriation by the Yale school in America enabled critics to continue their
hermetic interest in texts without considering the Foucauldian strain of post-
structuralism. As Edward Said points out, ‘Derrida’s criticism moves us into the text,
Foucault’s in and out’.36
If, like the New Humanities, Creative Writing is to go beyond Theory, it must also get
outside the text and explore how literature operates in society, not, in Foucault’s words,
as a substitute or ‘general envelope for all other discourses’, but as an active social agent
alongside other discourses.37 Creative Writing must become more than a pre-professional
training ground for artists dedicated to their craft and to a personal vision of the world
created by their imagination and realised through their individual voice or style, and for
whom theory is an antagonistic discourse. Equally, the writing workshop needs to be
more than a haven for avant-garde experimentalism where Theory provides a liberation
from outmoded generic distinctions. Rather, a new vision of authorship needs to be
elaborated, where literature is an intellectual practice alongside other non-literary
discourses in the academy, and where the division between fiction and non-fiction still
exists, but in a non-hierarchical relationship.
VOLUME9 NUMBER1 MAY2003186
the other, for example). However, the ambition of both these fictocritical effects is to
reconvene, perhaps only ideally and utopianly, feeling and thought, aesthetics and ethics,
refunctioning the dialectical movement between ‘neighbouring’ and ‘separation’ that
characterised non-Kantian sentimentalism.
Collage: sentimental allegory
The compositional pair collage/montage cannot be deployed without a contaminating
affect. Indeed, allegoricism and sadness are functions of each other, according to post-
Kantian models of the aesthetic.30 To work with fragments is to engage in a potentially
melancholy production of allegoresis, a re-coding of de-contextualised bits and pieces.31
For Walter Benjamin this ‘pile of ruins’ is the mournful point of departure for the
baroque ‘allegorical sensibility’ and, in Eric Santner’s view, ‘opens up extravagant and
excessive possibilities of recollection, recombination, and interpretation. It is in this
sense that the baroque allegorist has been regarded as the forebear of the postmodern
bricoleur.’32 As Benjamin aphoristically put it, ‘allegory is in the realm of thoughts what
ruins are in the realm of things’.33 According to Linda Nochlin, in modernity,
‘fragmentariness’ is a ‘quality shared by the perceiver–constructor and the object of
construction’.34 (What fragmentariness was to modernism, hybridity is to
postcolonialism, perhaps.) Peter Burger characterises ‘allegory which is fragment’ as the
correlative of ‘history as decline’: two responses to such historiography are utopianism
and nostalgia.35
This work on the conjunction between typographic display and elegiac tone began
with the decision to explore the politics that attends the fictocritical effect of textual
collage/montage, ‘writ[ing] with the discourse of others’.36 The reification of ‘voice’ as
textual fragment that typifies the architectonics of bricolage might now be partnered by
the attentiveness to affect implicit in listening for ‘tone’: ‘there is no escaping the crying
of the ghosts … one needs to be able to bear listening to the ghosts’.37 Self-conscious
efforts at ‘speaking montage’ are allegories of knowledge. In his essay on ‘Ethnographic
Allegory’, James Clifford notices ‘a recent tendency to distinguish allegorical levels as
specific “voices” within the text’.38 As Gregory Ulmer notes, cut and paste, collage/montage,
this self-conscious writing with fragments and spaces is ‘explicitly organized to say what
it is doing’ and ‘to provide its own commentary’.39 According to Clifford, we ‘say of it not
“this represents … that” but rather, “this is a (morally charged) story about that’’ ’.40
In fictocritical collage/montage, the blank space between text fragments is never
neutral. It can point to contradictory but paired allegorical meanings, both as a nostalgic
sign of rupture and lost totalities and as a signifier of utopian possibility. One effect is
shared: the space on the page figures in visual allegory a space in which the imagination
—
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I suggest that the distinction between the practice of artists and the theory of critics
can be circumnavigated by collapsing both figures into that of the intellectual, a figure
that incorporates both, without the need for hybridity, because it is based on a vision of
social agency rather than a theory of generic form or of the creative process. For an artist
to be an intellectual it is less important to have a theory of writing than to possess a
vision of how a literary work might operate in society and to assume responsibility for it.
Writers and the knowledge class
My interest in the intellectual is not as the central figure for a revolutionary politics or a
struggle within and against ‘regimes of truth’, but as the focus for an understanding of
the institutional conditions in which all writing takes place. A central preoccupation of
Cultural Studies since the inception of the Birmingham school has been the figure of the
intellectual. The most exhaustive examination (and example) of this preoccupation is
John Frow’s Cultural Studies and Cultural Value (1996). In this book Frow draws upon the
work of writers such as Alvin Gouldner, Barbara and John Ehrenreich, and Pierre
Bourdieu to situate ‘cultural intellectuals’ within a broader professional–managerial or
knowledge class.
Intellectuals are defined as professionals in possession of cultural capital, or stored
mental labour, which provides them with economic gain. For their reproduction they
rely on a system of credentialising through education, rather than non-meritocratic
authority in the form of privilege, money or state power. Frow argues that academics or
‘cultural intellectuals’ are a ‘local fraction’ of this knowledge class, with a ‘commitment to
the institutions of cultural capital, and simultaneously a set of anxieties about [their]
place within these institutions’.38
If one wished to locate Creative Writing within this framework, the awarding of
degrees in writing can be seen as an attempt to absorb the ‘placeless’ writer into the
institutional apparatus of the knowledge class by imposing systems of professional
training and accreditation on the practice of writing. This argument has often been
levelled against writing programmes. A.D. Hope, for instance, claimed in 1965, after a
visit to America, that universities were breeding their own supply of literature and soon
there would be no more wild writers left.39 Such alarmist critiques, however, tend to
neglect consideration of literature as an institutionalised profession.
One does not become a writer simply by virtue of putting pen to paper, or fingertip to
keyboard. One is credentialled as a writer by virtue of acquiring agents, securing
publishing contracts, being reviewed, selling books, and winning prizes and grants, as
well as gaining membership in professional organisations such as the Australian Society
of Authors. Writers are members of a new class of intellectuals because they control their
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Jones has reservations about the thaumatrope’s usefulness as a model of a more self-
conscious mode of cross-cultural scholarship. Perhaps the ‘blurring of identities’ that
constitutes one phase of the empathic process would dominate in montage’s ‘fast-
motioning embrace’. Perhaps the thaumatrope’s poetic effect is too like early nineteenth-
century models of hermeneutics. William Hazlitt’s essay ‘On Reason and Imagination’
provides an example of the nineteenth-century model of interaction between text and
reader:
Wherever any object takes such a hold of the mind as to make us dwell upon it, and
brood over it, melting the heart in tenderness, or kindling it to a sentiment of
enthusiasm;—wherever a movement of imagination or passion is impressed on the mind,
by which it seeks to prolong and repeat the emotion, to bring all other objects into
accord with it, and to give the same movement of harmony … to the sounds that express
it—this is poetry.27
Jones knows that in her speculation on an empathic tone or poetics to express affect
there is an echo of this and other inherited poetic and critical traditions: ‘A Romantic in
spite of myself’.28
She is not alone in apparently rejecting the romantic hermeneutics of sympathy as a
model for the politics of cross-cultural scholarship. In No Road (bitumen all the way)
Stephen Muecke suggests that instead of the blurring of identities that characterise a
romantic aesthetic based on metaphor, ‘you stand your text beside the text of the other so
there is a parallelism, perhaps only accidental encounters, like we produced in Reading
the Country’:
These two-figures—circle and parallel—represent a confrontation of methodology
between, on the one hand, the romantic aesthetic of participant ethnography, in which
the subject and object merge phenomenologically, and, on the other, the desire to retain
cultural autonomy and difference—the parallelism of both subject and object.29
Hodge and McHoul regarded Reading the Country as exemplary of a fictocritical ethic of
text and commentary. In Muecke’s model, a figure for metaphoric ‘blurring’ (montage) is
replaced by a figure for analogical contiguity (collage). Rather than seeing this as
radically different from Jones’s model, I would suggest that the focus has shifted from
‘merging’ to the self-conscious ‘detachment’ that re-opens the space between self and
other. Both these figures for empathic cross-cultural scholarship derive from the same
model of a dynamic imaginative process developed in the sentimental tradition. Read
together they rehearse the defining elements of the sentimental dialectic: ‘blurring’ and
‘detachment’. Neither is without its dangers (of obliterating difference, of reification of
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domain of knowledge (literature), but do not own the means of production (the
publishing industry), and they are distinguished from unskilled wage earners by their
possession of cultural capital—in this case, their talent and professional writing skills.
The aesthetic, or literary value, is thus an economic commodity.
It is obvious that Creative Writing is one institutional site of the literary establishment,
for it does provide employment for writers as writers, and skills training for aspirants. It
does not, however, perform a necessary function in the reproduction of literature.
Teachers of Creative Writing do not need university positions to write (although they
may need the income to support their writing) and students do not become qualified
writers by virtue of their study. In which case, Creative Writing must have another
function beyond its ‘official’ purpose of employing and training writers; it must have a
function specific to the university.
The university is a site for the reproduction of a broad intellectual or professional–
managerial class via professional training and accreditation. In other words, the
university is not where the knowledge class operates, but where it trains and recruits.
Humanist academics, or those cultural intellectuals who are trained and accredited to
stay within the university, are members of a broader class of knowledge workers, but
their professional domain of knowledge remains largely within its main apparatus of
reproduction. So if Creative Writing is a site for the professional training of writers, but is
not a necessary system of accreditation, its main function is to contribute to the domain
of knowledge of cultural intellectuals within the academy by the provision of a literary
education. The performance of this necessary function in fact contributes to the goal of
reproducing literature as a profession through the employment and training of writers,
precisely because the domain of knowledge that incorporates Creative Writing takes
literature as its object of study. This knowledge sustains the profession of literature by
affording it cultural prestige—thus increasing its capital or potential to generate more
capital, not to mention the direct sales generated by reading lists.
In order to reconcile its professed but not accredited purpose of training writers with
its necessary function as a contribution to academic teaching and research, Creative
Writing, however, must elaborate a figure of the writer capable of straddling these two
domains. The model of the writer as a professional artist for whom the university is
only a place for the transmission of craft skills and a knowledge of literary models
lacks the symbolic force to perform this reconciliation between unaccredited purpose
and necessary function. I will argue that it is the pseudo-mythic model of the public
intellectual who can straddle the academic world and the public sphere, and has become
the exemplary figure of the New Humanities, which provides the way forward for
Creative Writing.
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which the space between self and other opens again. The vigorous movement of the
thaumatrope produces a model for a briefly shared intersubjective space, an empathic
reconciliation. The empathic process is like a ‘bold swinging—demanding the most
intensive stirring of one’s being into the life of the other’, physical metaphors that recall
the late-eighteenth-century ideas of self-transcendence.21 The thaumatrope is an object to
think with, literalising the movement, identification, fantastic projection, incorporation,
self-conscious oscillation between subject positions, and analytic detachment that
characterise the sentimental imagination in its empathic mode.
Jones allegorises the thaumatrope’s pre-cinematic montage as ‘a kind of metaphor for
cross-cultural scholarship’—‘hoping to set in process a dialectic by which … the self and
other will breezily combine, cultures discontinuous will appear continuous’, all the time
knowing this is an ‘anterior misrepresentation’. Jones acknowledges a need to honour
‘the exquisite, grave and finally humane banality of affect itself’, using the thaumatrope
to perform her desire: ‘the impelling exhalation, the fast-motioning embrace of that
which wishes to reconvene, ideally and utopianly, the beautiful black woman with the
small white baby’.22 The dialectic enacted by the thaumatrope produces a series of
intersubjective relays that characterise empathy as a linked visual and spatial effect, in
particular the simultaneous availability of multiple viewpoints. Recent scholarship,
surveyed by Thompson, suggests that empathy ‘provides a viewpoint in which one’s
centre of orientation becomes one among others’, ideally without hierarchy.23
The same dialectic of self and other, neighbouring and separation, has been offered as
the condition of possibility for an ethical politics of text and commentary. In the face of a
need for what they call a ‘more self-conscious mode of textual commentary’, Bob Hodge
and Alec McHoul suggest that fictocriticism might model a practice ‘where the term
“commentary” itself might now be under erasure’.24 Their model includes the political,
territorial and imaginative movement that empathic criticism requires in order to free up
a space for others.
Of course this would mean risking falling into the well-defined spaces of mastery and
libertarianism. Those grooves would always be beckoning to either side of the space or
spacing between them. But it remains the case that any such pair of grooves (if they are in
any way distinct, and we think they are) must as it were, throw up a ridge between them.
It is this ridge that we would be wanting to negotiate (almost in the topographical sense).25
Fictocriticism might produce an empathic critical stance, a shared textual horizon
somewhere in the spaces produced by what Heidegger calls ‘the struggle’ between




The current preoccupation with the idea of the public intellectual seems to have been
prompted by Russel Jacoby’s The Last Intellectuals: American Culture in the Age of Academe
(1987). In this book Jacoby claimed that preoccupation with intellectuals as a
sociological class was symptomatic of a decline in public intellectual life and the dearth
of independent intellectuals, or ‘writers and thinkers who address a general and educated
audience’.40 Since the publication of Jacoby’s book the idea of a public intellectual has
engaged critical interest throughout the 1990s, becoming the subject of several symposia
and conferences, and seeping into our general lexicon.41 That the function of criticism
has become absorbed in this wider concern with the social role of the intellectual is
evidenced by Edward Said’s 1993 Reith Lectures, published as Representations of the
Intellectuals. In The World, the Text and the Critic, Said spoke of the ‘critical consciousness’
being embodied in the oppositional critic and called for a more ‘worldly’ textual
criticism. Ten years later he had shifted from a vision of criticism within the university to
a vision of the intellectual outside the university. He speaks of the need for intellectuals
to operate as independent ‘amateurs’, rather than institutionalised professionals, and to
‘speak the truth to power’.42
Debate about the figure of the public intellectual and what it represents is generally
organised around the terms established by Jacoby’s book: that intellectual work now
takes place largely within the academy. Those who agree with Jacoby are concerned with
how academics can overcome their professional myopia and engage with the general
public by moving between academia and the world of journalism, either to overcome the
obscurantist jargon of Theory, or to disseminate the insights of Theory more broadly.
Those who disagree challenge his outmoded concept of the public sphere and argue that
as teachers in public institutions, as researchers who publish their work, and as
professional media consultants, academics already operate as public intellectuals. Or they
point out that academics cannot simply choose to become public intellectuals; this
depends on the workings of the media.43
What has given the figure of the public intellectual its current cachet, however, is the
fact that jeremiads against its disappearance, attempts to revive it, and defences of
academic work all overlap with moves to reconfigure the humanities as an institution with
greater public influence. One recommendation of the 1998 review of the humanities,
Knowing Ourselves and Others, was that ‘Universities further facilitate and provide
incentives for the contributions that academics make to the public discussion of issues of
importance’ and ‘extend the connections between Humanities scholars and the media’.44
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McCarthy, romantic ‘Absorption in the Other … demands a great degree of self-consciousness,
an ostensibly paradoxical dialectic which illustrates sympathy’s roots in moral as well as
aesthetic theory’.16 The problems that accompany this dialectic remain pressing and are
reflected in Armstrong’s understanding of empathy as power-ridden and individualist.
Does sympathy/empathy, as McCarthy argues, require a ‘blurring of self and Other’; how
is the self involved with and differentiated from the other? ‘Does self-awareness follow
from Other-awareness; to what extent is the focus in sympathy on the self versus the
Other?’ In this dialectical model of sympathy/empathy, thought and feeling produce a
‘shared experiential space between the sympathetic self and the Other’.17
McCarthy’s summary of recent psychological models under the heading ‘empathy and
cognition’ lists four phases of empathy that might be regarded in part as the
contemporary afterlife of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century sentimentalism. First, an
involuntary identification, in which ‘we are projected into the other person by our own
fantasy, response, or feeling’. Second, ‘incorporation’, or ‘taking the other person into
ourselves’. Third, ‘the dialectic between the actual me and the me which is identified
with the other person’, and fourth, ‘detachment’, or deliberately moving away ‘to gain the
social and psychic distance necessary for objective analysis’. The effects of ‘absorption
and blurring of identities’, characteristically described as motion or reverberation, ‘imply
a back-and-forth movement and suggest that empathy is a process’, not a moment.18
Empathy works the gap between self and other and repeats the dialectical oscillation
between sameness and difference, thought and feeling, ethics and aesthetics inherited
from a non-Kantian tradition of moral philosophy.
Gail Jones provides a striking visual equivalent of empathy as an active process, ‘based
on the necessity to reconcile the presumed separation between self and other’,19 in her
fictocritical essay ‘Thaumatropes’:
I possess a small antiquarian scientific toy called, somewhat ostentatiously, a
thaumatrope. Despite its name it is blithely simple, consisting of a series of cardboard
discs strung on a string. When the discs are rotated, by breath or manipulation, images
on either side are visually combined. On one side … is a black Mammy figure, on the
other a white baby; when the disc spins around the woman appears to hold the baby.
(This is an especially captivating image for me because it recapitulates a childhood dream
in which I believed myself the daughter of an Aboriginal mother.)20
The oscillation between objectification, a ‘looking at the Other’, and a ‘blurring of
identities’ that enacts the ‘fantasy’ of ‘incorporation’ is followed by the ‘dialectic between
the actual me’ of the self-conscious narrator and ‘me’ identified with the ‘other person’.
Jones’s self-reflexive writing also stages the final ‘detachment’ and ‘objective analysis’ in
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Bob Hodge wrote in 1995 that the ‘values which people working in cultural studies
and the New Humanities sincerely and strongly hold are labelled as political
correctness’.45 Anti-political correctness campaigns flooded the American media in the
early 1990s and forced humanities departments to defend their activities publicly, while
privately questioning them. In the introduction to an anthology of essays entitled After
Political Correctness, the editors claimed that the book was designed to develop prospects
‘for a more public humanities’ by ‘redesigning and expanding the social and cultural role
of the academic humanities’.46 It is due to both the conservative critique within the
media of the dangers of political correctness, and the disillusionment with dehistoricised
Theory of left-leaning intellectuals within the academy, that the idea of the public
intellectual gains purchase throughout the 1990s.
In Australia complaints about political correctness gained a much broader social
context with the election of a conservative federal government in 1996. The term was
levelled against so-called cultural ‘elites’, characterised as left-wing apologists for
minority interest groups. This coincided with savage funding cuts to university budgets.
So the need for humanities departments to identify ways in which they are relevant to
society also arose in the face of a growing managerial culture in universities, evident in
Australia in the decade or so from the Dawkins reforms to the 1999 white paper on
research and research training by David Kemp, which emphasised accountability to
public funds and encouraged a culture of entrepreneurialism.47
These social and institutional pressures overlap with the goals of Cultural Studies
itself, an interdisciplinary enterprise concerned with producing politically engaged
critiques of the everyday and the power relationships involved in culture as a whole way
of life. This overlap is most evident in the development of that section of Cultural Studies
known as Cultural Policy, which, according to Tony Bennett, was both a practical
response to the Dawkins reforms and a theoretical reformulation of cultural theory and
critical practice along Foucauldian lines.48
Creative writing and public intellectuals
The public intellectual has become the exemplary figure of the New Humanities, not
necessarily as a model which individual academics can aspire to and train students to
take up, but as a zone of contestation, a discursive site in which debates about the
institutional function of the humanities in the wider community are played out. There is
no specific figure of literary authority in the New Humanities, no critic to proclaim upon
literature as a distinct realm. Rather, there is a more free-ranging figure of the intellectual
whose work is motivated by oppositional criticism in its broadest sense, that is, textual
—
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asserted conduction between them is achieved through the deployment of abstract terms
such as ‘motion’ or ‘movement’, along with other words that describe the work of the
imagination familiar in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century thought.8 The ‘sympathetic’
and ‘ethical’ imaginations are characteristically ‘active’ in this oscillation between thought
and feeling, an aesthetic effect that requires the aesthetic order to be distinguished but
not separated from the ethical.9 In the hermeneutics of sympathy implied by elegiac
historiography the poetics of elegy would move the reader to ‘respond with a concomitant
emotion and imagination … to answer the [writer’s] call’, a dynamic in which it is
implied that writer and reader contribute equally.10 In a thus renovated postcolonial field
the work of sympathy nonetheless ‘takes place within the realm of fiction, mimesis,
representation, and reproduction … our experience of sympathy depends on an aesthetic
experience. Sympathy in this sense is always already an aesthetic experience.’11
Jones’s speculation that an aestheticised ethics might remediate the theoreticism of
postcolonial studies seems to imply that empathic responsiveness to suffering (past and
present) would activate mourning as a methodology. Before mapping the concepts of
melancholy and mourning, I want to explore briefly some possible models of empathy/
sympathy that might prove adequate to this culturally therapeutic task. I will suggest that
the dialectical interplay of ethics and aesthetics, thought and feeling, sketched above is
replicated in the conceptualising of empathy. Further, I will suggest that the same
conceptualisation describes the processes of melancholy and mourning. As a
methodology then, postcolonial empathic fictocriticism might be expected to repeat the
dialectical interplay of ethics and aesthetics inherited from the sentimental tradition. In
particular, I will argue that fictocritical effects in the field of postcolonial studies redeploy
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century models, although the currently dominant terms
(empathy and ethics) usually replace an earlier vocabulary of ‘sympathy’ and ‘morals’.12
What Armstrong calls the linked visual and spatial model of empathic accommodation,
a double territorial and imaginative movement, hints at the key issue for Thomas
McCarthy in models of empathy: ‘the way in which the self participates intellectually and
emotionally in the experience of the Other’.13 In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
‘sympathy’ is a particular idea of the imagination and a central moral and aesthetic
problem. The sympathetic imagination ‘is able to penetrate the barrier which puts space
between it and its object’ and ‘secure a momentary but complete identification with it’.14
As a simultaneously intellectual and emotional activity, this momentary, paradoxical self-
transcendence and self-involvement is often described in metaphors of movement. James
Engell summarises the early nineteenth-century complex of activities associated with
romantic sympathy: the ability to ‘escape’ the self, to ‘identify with other people’, to
‘perceive things in a new way’ and to ‘coalesce’ subject and object.15 According to
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or cultural critique of received opinion, with the ultimate aim of effecting social change,
or at least alteration of public opinion, beyond the refinements of disciplinary
knowledge. If Creative Writing is able to elaborate a figure of the writer as a literary
intellectual in this sense, it will claim a stronger disciplinary position within the New
Humanities than it will by perpetuating a theory/practice divide or evading it with hybrid
forms of writing. The narrative of generic supersession implied by a category such as
fictocriticism, which nonetheless relies for its dynamism on a continued separation
between creative and critical genres, does not help address the issue of how purportedly
‘naïve’ works of literature, such as realist novels or confessional poems, operate in
contemporary society or critical practice. Nor does it help provide strategies for the
writing workshop to discuss and teach these far more popular forms of literature.
One of the main problems seen to be facing attempts by academics to operate as
public intellectuals is the Research Quantum, which will award points to refereed journal
articles, but not to articles in mass-circulation newspapers or magazines. This is also the
problem that faces teachers of Creative Writing. Those who teach in Creative Writing are
hired not only because of their academic records, but because of their publishing record
outside the academy. In this case, teachers of writing wish to claim research points for
their ‘public’ writing.
The traditional PhD is a rite of passage for young intellectuals seeking academic work,
but its emphasis on what Judith Brett calls ‘the endless qualification’, and the necessity
for specialisation rather than overarching commentary, means that it is designed for
examiners rather than a general, even a general academic readership.49 Creative Writing
is somewhat different. Those who undertake postgraduate work in this discipline are
more likely to be seeking a general audience rather than an academic one, because their
medium is not academic prose, but fictional or poetic writing. But if writers address a
public, they are not considered as intellectuals, or at least, not in the form with which
they make this address.
If the forum of the public intellectual is the media, the form is non-fiction—reviews,
essays, newspaper columns, public lectures, panel sessions, television and radio
interviews. A writer of novels and stage or screenplays, and less commonly of poetry, can
command a presence as a public intellectual, but only by stepping outside the realms of
fiction and operating in the forms mentioned above. That is, writers’ fictional work may
get them noticed in the public sphere, but they can only operate and be acknowledged as
public intellectuals if they write columns, give lectures or provide interviews. For
instance McKenzie Wark has claimed that ‘If there is one little window through which
younger people get into traditional zones of public life at the moment it is creative
writing’.50
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sufficiently ‘radical aesthetic’. In her only reference to empathy in The Radical Aesthetic,
Isobel Armstrong states that:
[t]his linked visual and spatial accommodation is important, for a freeing up of space
for others has a double political and territorial and imaginative movement that has
consequences for civil society … Empathy is essentially a power-ridden construction of
relations and a sentimental understanding of ‘community’. It is an individualist reading
of what must belong to a collective experience.3
Perhaps the charge of individualism is to some extent inevitable if fictocritical writers are
committed to proceed ‘case by case’, an ‘I’ and a ‘thou’.4 Armstrong’s understanding of
‘empathy’ invokes categories evident in Australian cross-cultural fictocritical writing (for
example, space, movement, imagination). Also evident is a positive valence given to what
might be called the sentimental imagination. My broad question is: can Australian cross-
cultural fictocritical writing re-function the sentimental tradition as a counter-discursive
and radical aesthetic?
The aim is not to diagnose the presence or absence of sentimentality so much as to
deploy sentimentality as a diagnostic tool. In pursuing these categories into fictocritical
writing in the cross-cultural field it will be evident that the modernist disparagement of
‘sentiment’ and the Kantian rupture between thought and feeling have been replaced by a
concept of ‘sentiment’, which values these categories’ involvement in one another. Cross-
cultural remedial methodology relies on the re-aestheticising of the ethical domain.
Instead of defining the aesthetic as a separate order of significance distinct from the
cognitive and ethical spheres, the ethical and the aesthetic emerge in this work of
reconciliation as a revived eighteenth-century conjunction. Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl
of Shaftesbury, for example, regarded the ethical and the aesthetic as exercises of the
same (imaginative) faculty.5 Joseph Addison and Richard Steele affirmed the sentimental
imagination’s responsiveness to the suffering and distress of others: ‘sentiment …
originally meant not simply feeling, but feeling justified by a moral idea’. Postcolonial
cross-cultural writing, understood as an example of a ‘modern ideological passion’, is a
‘true avatar of moral sentimentalism’.6
In this sense, the ‘affective’, ‘ethical’ and ‘aesthetic’ turns repeatedly diagnosed in
contemporary culture belong together as instances of the post-romantic inheritance of
the sentimental tradition. In attempting to make the affective (feeling) perform the work
of the ethical (thought) through a species of identification, contemporary cultural analysis
at the same time tries to keep the distinction between thought and feeling in place, thus
re-enacting the central problem of sentiment. We inherit these concepts as side by side
yet distinguished from each other, ‘neighbouring’ in their ‘separation’.7 Even now the
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fictocritical empathy
and the work of mourning
HEATHER KERR
Ethics/aesthetics and the dialectic of empathy
Fictocritical effects in the service of ethically self-conscious cross-cultural writing belong
to the larger category of ‘trauma studies’, conducted under the sign of the anti-aesthetic.1
Such a project proceeds as if ethics and aesthetics are not or need not be estranged from
one another. This is evident in aesthetic practices that aim to ‘heal’ through cross-cultural
reconciliation, often figured in imaginative acts of empathy/sympathy. Gail Jones has
asked:
Where, in our theorising, is the space of the elegiac? … The spaces of political bravery.
Of risk. Of loss. Post-colonial studies is a melancholy field, concerned as it is with the
elucidation of barbarity. Perhaps, therefore it needs access to a language (a tone, a
poetics) to express the ethical imperatives of mourning.2
What is at stake in this fictocritical aesthetic remediation? What existing practices would
it re-function, supplement or supersede? Is mourning adequate to the task of cross-
cultural reconciliation? How might fictocritical effects be animated in the service of this
aim? In the process of exploring these questions I will suggest that the methodology of
mourning is an allegorical vehicle for cross-cultural writing. Employed to remediate the
colonial inheritance, it nonetheless requires acts of empathy according to models of the
imagination that are part and parcel of that inheritance.
To explore such conjunctions of ethics and aesthetics in the context of Australian
fictocritical writing is to confront the rejection of ‘empathy’ as a necessary and
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Here he is thinking specifically of writers of grunge fiction and the possibilities of a
‘young public’ being formed around them. These writers were popular at writers’
festivals, Wark claims, when ‘grunge’ was a marketable category, but ‘I’m still waiting for
the gatekeepers to give them a go as broadcasters on ABC Radio National, or as
columnists in the newspapers, or to feature at conferences organised by bodies like the
National Book Council’.51 In making this point, Wark demonstrates that it is the media
‘vector’ of fiction, alongside the Internet and womens magazines, which he points out as
unacknowledged public forums of debate, that militates against these writers as much as
their youth. In an interview with Robert Dessaix, Don Anderson has claimed ‘I don’t
think that literary intellectuals—or let’s say literary practitioners such as poets, novelists
or dramatists—ought to have more attention paid to them when they speak about larger
issues of state than anybody else with an informed vote’.52
To encourage a view of literary practice as preparatory work for the role of public
social commentary in more authoritative forms of discourse is not a viable option for the
discipline of Creative Writing, as this neglects a consideration of the work writers do as
writers. Of course, some writing courses teach fiction and poetry alongside journalistic
and professional writing, and many writers function as reviewers and journalists to
supplement their income, but I am interested in retaining the integrity of Creative
Writing as a discipline of intellectual work rather than denying that writers can perform
in other modes of public discourse.
It is, of course, notoriously difficult to define exactly what literature is: is it non-
fiction; figurative language; writing which employs ‘literary’ techniques such as narrative,
character, etc.; writing which evokes emotional rather than intellectual responses; writing
which is creative or imaginative? It is relatively easy, however, to accept what sort of
writing operates as literature. Literature is what fiction or poetry editors accept for
publication, what gets shelved in those sections in bookshops, what is reviewed in those
categories in newspapers and magazines, what wins literary prizes and grants. Literature
is what people read when they want to be entertained, or to escape into a fictional world,
or to appreciate the heightened uses of language. Literature is what thousands of
students across Australia want to write when they enrol in Creative Writing courses. So
while literature may be just another form of cultural production, and cannot be defended
as a special type of language, it is nonetheless the assumption of aesthetic difference that
governs its operation in society. ‘The ontological groundlessness of literature’, John
Guillory reminds us, ‘in no way diminishes its social effects as a means of marking the
status of certain texts and genres’.53 In which case, to treat it simply as another type of
writing, as a form of rhetoric to be mastered alongside advertising and journalistic copy,
may help overcome unproductive preconceptions held by some students, such as that of
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untrammelled inspiration, but it nonetheless glosses over the specificity and complexity
of the functions of literature.
In conceiving of a public to be addressed through the media, public intellectuals
imagine a citizenry to be influenced by argument, especially about current and particular
social issues. ‘Creative’ writers, in seeking publication, obviously seek a readership, but
the audience they imagine is an abstract construct. Literature does influence the public,
however, which is why some literary works are used to educate citizens and some are
censored or banned for the ostensible good of the populace. The responsibility of writers
lies not in whom they address or speak for, but in recognising how literature functions in
society. How might this responsibility be encouraged?
For a start, as well as professional artists who pass on their knowledge to literary
aspirants, university teachers of writing must be recognised as academics who practise
criticism in the workshop. The question is, what sort of criticism should this be? A ‘more
practical institution’ of practical criticism, as Robert Miles suggests, or a socially
conscious oppositional criticism?54
Notes for a new pedagogy
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play-writing, claimed ‘Complete freedom of choice in subject and complete freedom in
treatment so that the individuality of the artist may have its best expression are
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sexism, or readers imagine themselves in the moral situations of the characters, or even
suggest that the work fails aesthetically because of a lack of thematic complexity. I am
talking about employing oppositional criticism precisely to interrogate the assumptions
about literature underpinning these responses and then to consider how the work in
question differs from and interrelates with a range of non-literary discourses of gendered
power relations.
The problem with eschewing any form of programmatic provision for this, in favour of
the general dynamic of workshop discussion, is that a well-written and politically
inoffensive piece will most likely pass through the aesthetic filter of the workshop
process without a consideration of how it relates to anything beyond the writer’s own
personal satisfaction. This is buttressed by the fact that exemplary texts are generally
studied for their formal qualities rather than their social or political resonances.
While formalist analysis of texts is the necessary first step in the workshop, it is
unproductive for texts to be considered in an aesthetic vacuum. For instance, why have
the stories of Raymond Carver been the exemplary model for so many teachers of
Creative Writing? Is it because the pared-down minimalist style he represents is the most
amenable to being taught, that it shores up the easy workshop practice of raking through
manuscripts in search of unnecessary adjectives, embodied in the dictum of ‘show don’t
tell’? Is it because the ‘dirty realist’ emphasis on the local and the mundane also helps
promote the orthodoxy that aspiring writers should write from what they know?
If, for example, the work of Anne Sexton is to be studied as a model for students who
wish to write of their own experiences, discussion could entail not just her use of free
verse or her ability to distill autobiographical detail into poetic form, but the historical
and critical context of confessional poetry, its relationship to feminist politics and
psychoanalysis, its association with psychic stress and insanity, and hence its concept of
writing as therapy, its shift away from ‘impersonal’ modernist symbolism. This would
provide students not just with a range of ahistorical devices and forms, but an awareness
of the political effects of aesthetic decisions.
Another strategy may be to introduce critical or theoretical works from a Cultural
Studies perspective which actively interrogate the category of ‘literature’ in relation to
things such as popular cultural practices, the media and new technologies, identity
politics, policy formation and public debate. McKenzie Wark’s The Virtual Republic
(1997) is one possible example, for its analysis of the Demidenko affair occupies a space
in a broader discussion of the culture wars in contemporary Australian society. However,
intervention by teachers in the actual workshopping process may have greater
pedagogical force than a more varied reading list. If each student manuscript is not only
afforded a remedial technical overhauling in the workshop, but is placed within a
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cannot be seen as a neutral site where these negotiations take place. In the paradigm of
the New Humanities, the university is a public institution which fosters a dialogue
between academic analysis, social discourse and public policy. Creative Writing is an
academic discipline which can contribute to this dialogue, but a more socially engaged
and intellectually aware pedagogy needs to be articulated through a sustained theoretical
encounter with the contemporary humanities. It is not by reasserting authorial intention
as the basis of critical evaluation that writers will claim intellectual authority within the
academy, but by exploring the political and discursive effects of their literary products
and accepting responsibility for them. By doing this writers can be seen as public
intellectuals, not in the nostalgic sense of independent freelance thinkers, but as
participants in the intellectual work of the New Humanities.
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recently completed a PhD at the University of Melbourne entitled ‘Building a Garret in the
Ivory Tower: English Studies and the Discipline of Creative Writing’. He currently lectures in
the School of English at the University of New South Wales.
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broader cultural or political context by the critical expertise of the teacher, then student
writers will be given a greater understanding of how their creative work might relate to
their essays in other classes, and of how they might consider placing themselves as
writers in society, as intellectuals who can potentially contribute to public debate via the
medium of literature, rather than merely seeing potential publication as affirmation of
their ‘talent’.
Furthermore, it would be worthwhile for students to consider literary works from
countries where social unrest or political censorship force a greater sense of
responsibility upon writers to view themselves as intellectuals (especially those writers
supported by International PEN). How does this social responsibility impact upon
aesthetic decisions?56 While in a country such as France there is a tradition of accepting
writers as intellectuals, one problem with literary culture in Australia is that it tends to be
absorbed in its institutional function as an entertainment industry. As a result most
publishers are increasingly unwilling to take the financial risk of publishing first-time
authors whose work is deemed ‘experimental’. In a 1999 interview, Jane Palfreyman,
publisher at Random House, claimed that ten years ago work from Creative Writing
courses ‘seemed to be leaning towards the impenetrable, literary style, or a post-modernistic
mish-mash of styles. Now I am receiving MA theses which include detective fiction and
popular fiction—the idea of what is acceptable creative writing seems to have broadened’.57
How are writing programmes to position themselves in relation to these conditions?
In a sense, the ‘exegesis’, or accompanying critical essay, which is a requirement for
most research higher degrees in writing in Australian universities, fulfils the
contextualising function that I have argued is necessary in undergraduate workshops.
However, most teachers and students of writing are wary about this exegesis as a
theoretical explanation or justification of the creative work.58 While this contextualising
work may be desirable and necessary, it need not be formally articulated and presented
for submission as a critical supplement to the creative work. An alternative option might
be a series of internally assessable pieces, such as book reviewing, analysis of literary
media controversies, research into the history and operations of institutions such as
publishing companies and funding bodies, all of which can be justified professionally
whether graduates go on to become teachers or writers, and give students a broader
intellectual context for their work. In other words, the grooming of students for
professional involvement in the literary establishment can be complemented with a
cultural analysis of the power relations implicit in its machinations. This is the model
adopted by Communication and Cultural Studies.
Creative Writing hovers between a vocational traineeship for the publishing industry
and an artistic haven from the pressures of commercialism. The university, however,
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sexism, or readers imagine themselves in the moral situations of the characters, or even
suggest that the work fails aesthetically because of a lack of thematic complexity. I am
talking about employing oppositional criticism precisely to interrogate the assumptions
about literature underpinning these responses and then to consider how the work in
question differs from and interrelates with a range of non-literary discourses of gendered
power relations.
The problem with eschewing any form of programmatic provision for this, in favour of
the general dynamic of workshop discussion, is that a well-written and politically
inoffensive piece will most likely pass through the aesthetic filter of the workshop
process without a consideration of how it relates to anything beyond the writer’s own
personal satisfaction. This is buttressed by the fact that exemplary texts are generally
studied for their formal qualities rather than their social or political resonances.
While formalist analysis of texts is the necessary first step in the workshop, it is
unproductive for texts to be considered in an aesthetic vacuum. For instance, why have
the stories of Raymond Carver been the exemplary model for so many teachers of
Creative Writing? Is it because the pared-down minimalist style he represents is the most
amenable to being taught, that it shores up the easy workshop practice of raking through
manuscripts in search of unnecessary adjectives, embodied in the dictum of ‘show don’t
tell’? Is it because the ‘dirty realist’ emphasis on the local and the mundane also helps
promote the orthodoxy that aspiring writers should write from what they know?
If, for example, the work of Anne Sexton is to be studied as a model for students who
wish to write of their own experiences, discussion could entail not just her use of free
verse or her ability to distill autobiographical detail into poetic form, but the historical
and critical context of confessional poetry, its relationship to feminist politics and
psychoanalysis, its association with psychic stress and insanity, and hence its concept of
writing as therapy, its shift away from ‘impersonal’ modernist symbolism. This would
provide students not just with a range of ahistorical devices and forms, but an awareness
of the political effects of aesthetic decisions.
Another strategy may be to introduce critical or theoretical works from a Cultural
Studies perspective which actively interrogate the category of ‘literature’ in relation to
things such as popular cultural practices, the media and new technologies, identity
politics, policy formation and public debate. McKenzie Wark’s The Virtual Republic
(1997) is one possible example, for its analysis of the Demidenko affair occupies a space
in a broader discussion of the culture wars in contemporary Australian society. However,
intervention by teachers in the actual workshopping process may have greater
pedagogical force than a more varied reading list. If each student manuscript is not only
afforded a remedial technical overhauling in the workshop, but is placed within a
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untrammelled inspiration, but it nonetheless glosses over the specificity and complexity
of the functions of literature.
In conceiving of a public to be addressed through the media, public intellectuals
imagine a citizenry to be influenced by argument, especially about current and particular
social issues. ‘Creative’ writers, in seeking publication, obviously seek a readership, but
the audience they imagine is an abstract construct. Literature does influence the public,
however, which is why some literary works are used to educate citizens and some are
censored or banned for the ostensible good of the populace. The responsibility of writers
lies not in whom they address or speak for, but in recognising how literature functions in
society. How might this responsibility be encouraged?
For a start, as well as professional artists who pass on their knowledge to literary
aspirants, university teachers of writing must be recognised as academics who practise
criticism in the workshop. The question is, what sort of criticism should this be? A ‘more
practical institution’ of practical criticism, as Robert Miles suggests, or a socially
conscious oppositional criticism?54
Notes for a new pedagogy
In his preface to Dramatic Technique (1919), George Pierce Baker, an early teacher of
play-writing, claimed ‘Complete freedom of choice in subject and complete freedom in
treatment so that the individuality of the artist may have its best expression are
indispensable in the development of great art’ and that creative courses should provide
students with ‘technique based on study of successful dramatists’.55 This model for
teaching Creative Writing is based on the assumption that talent can’t be taught, but can
be nurtured by a training in literary craft. This may seem reasonable enough, but its
persistence today indicates an unwillingness to engage with contemporary critiques of
the aesthetic, or to extend the critical range of the workshop.
If Creative Writing is to negotiate a position within the New Humanities, perhaps the
idea of complete artistic freedom for individual expression needs to be challenged. It is
not viable, of course, to prescribe the content of students’ writing, but it is possible to
provide a critical context for its reception, beyond consideration of the quality of
metaphors or the number of adjectives in a sentence or the rhythmic timing of line
breaks. Is it enough for students to write stories of obviously unreconstructed sexism in
the name of personal expression or artistic exploration when theoretically untenable
prejudices will not be accepted in essays for other classes? Granted, problems such as
these may be profitably addressed and challenged within the workshop, most likely by
peers, but I’m not talking of shifting from practical considerations of craft to general
discussion where the manuscript—and, by extension, its author—is put on trial for
—
